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**Maneuver Warfare Theory and The
Operational Level of War: Misguiding
The Marine Corps?**

**A Monograph
by**

**Major G.S. Lauer
U.S. Marine Corps**

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**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This monograph examines the effects of the adoption of the maneuver warfare theory on the practice and understanding of the operational level of war by the U. S. Marine Corps. The soundness of the maneuver warfare theory at the operational level of war forms the basis of this argument. The maneuver warfare theory is an inductive logical argument which presents decking assertions about some events of a subject battle in this case and makes an inductive 'leap' to a conclusion about a future event. The 'inductive leap' of the maneuver theory is that future battles are to be won through maneuver to disrupt the enemy's decision cycle rather than through the enemy's destruction. This monograph refutes this belief by demonstrating that the inductive 'leap' is unwarranted and unsound. The criteria for the analysis are historical in nature and demonstrate the soundness of Marine Corps experience of the operations during World War II. The unsoundness of the theory is demonstrated by showing that the maneuver assertions of the primacy of avoidance of battle and the inaptitudes (momentum) at the operational level are based on a faulty history and cannot be shown to be truthful when examined in light of the facts recorded. The implications for the United States Marine Corps are that the adoption of this duly flawed theory as the basis for operational doctrine will lead to an unsound tactics doctrine which in turn will lead to faulty training and ineffective force structure. The maneuver theory misguides the doctrine and forces structure of the Marine Corps in the next war.			
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
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
Monograph Director

COL J. L. Moody, B.S., B.A.



Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies

COL J. R. McDonough, M.S.



Director, Graduate
Degree Program

Phillip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Accepted this 8th day of May 1991

ABSTRACT

Maneuver Warfare Theory and the Operational Level of War: Misguiding the Marine Corps? by Major G. S. Lauer, USMC, 42 pages.

The maneuver warfare theory became the basis for Marine Corps doctrine in 1989. The maneuver theory represents a fundamental change in the way the Marine Corps plans to fight future wars. From the balanced combined arms force prior to 1989, this theory postulates the primacy of maneuver and the operational level of war. Inherent in the concept of maneuver is the idea that movement within the decision cycle of an enemy is the key to victory at any level of war. Maneuver warfare is a style of warfare which alleges to be superior to the concept of firepower/attrition. It is the soundness of this theory which forms the basis of this monograph.

History forms the primary source of theory. From theory flows the operational, and then tactical doctrine which forces employ to attain victory on the battlefield. Doctrine forms the basis for training and force structure.

The Marine Corps developed an historical appreciation and understanding for the operational level of war as a result of the experience of World War II. In agreement with the historical evolution of the operational level of war, that history demonstrated the need for joint operations, the integrated development and execution of distributed campaigns, and the need for a distributed system of logistics. The theoretical basis of the operational level of war was based on the primacy of destruction to break the will of an enemy. The maneuver warfare theory proposes to change that basis.

This monograph refutes the theory of maneuver by demonstrating that the theory is unsound as a basis for the development of operational doctrine. The maneuver assertions that avoidance of battle, deception, momentum, and the primacy of maneuver over firepower are the keys to victory, cannot be demonstrated as truthful. This remains true whether the proof offered is the German army of World War II, or the U. S. Marine Corps.

The implication, then, is that an unsound theory leads to an unsound doctrine at the operational level. Thus, the tactical doctrine derived from that operational doctrine must also be flawed. Perhaps of greatest consequence, however, is that the tactical forces which the Marine Corps must build to fight will also be incorrect. In its insistence on an unsound premise for the operational level of war, the maneuver warfare theory misguides the doctrine and forces with which the Marine Corps will fight the next war.

	
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I. Introduction

The United States Marine Corps adopted the theory of maneuver warfare as the basis for doctrine with the publication of FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, in 1989.¹ Prior to the adoption of this theory, there was no articulated theory of war upon which the Marine Corps sought to base its doctrine. The basis for Marine doctrine was its own history of war and battle. That historical experience led to a balanced concept of firepower and maneuver to destroy enemy forces in battle. Warfighting doctrine led to the creation of balanced combined arms combat forces. The training of these forces emphasized the value of integrated fire and maneuver. The adoption of the maneuver warfare theory appears to change this concept.²

Maneuver warfare seeks to attain the objectives of a campaign, battle, or engagement through the psychological disruption of an enemy.³ A maneuver style of warfighting maintains that fighting, or combat, is of limited importance.⁴ "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."⁵ The operational level of war is paramount in the maneuver style of warfare, and ideally seeks "to produce a decision without any fighting."⁶ The foundation of the maneuver theory appears to rest on the notion that victory is more cheaply, more quickly, and more

decisively achieved through maneuver to create psychological disruption,⁷ rather than through destruction.⁸ The maneuver theory proposes the primacy of the operational level of war as the means to achieve the goal of maneuver for psychological disruption.⁹

Marine Corps experience of the operational level of war during World War II revolved around the destruction of enemy forces in battle during naval campaigns.¹⁰ The development of a balanced combined arms concept of battle which drove force structure and training was the result of this operational level experience. Does the adoption of the maneuver warfare theory, as doctrine for the operational level of war, improperly focus the United States Marine Corps away from its historical understanding and practice of operational art?

The impact of the maneuver theory on the institution of the Marine Corps is both profound and fundamental. Maneuver doctrine at the operational level may reduce the importance of, or indeed the necessity for, battle. Therefore, the tactical forces which must be built can be largely changed. The following force structure initiatives propose to bring the Marine Corps more into line with a maneuver style of warfighting:

- 1) Elimination of two F/A-18 squadrons;
- 2) Reduction of M1A1 buy of one-half;
- 3) Removal of all self-propelled 155mm and 8-inch artillery;
- 4) No procurement of MLRS;
- 5) Change of direct support artillery from 155mm to 105mm.¹¹

A maneuver doctrine further mandates substantial training changes. Mobility, lightness, and reduced reliance on firepower systems to increase operational mobility are paramount for tactical forces fighting under a maneuver style of war. Combat forces must now emphasize light infantry tactics and low-intensity conflict. Under a maneuver theory, traditional concepts of the importance of close combat and destruction of enemy forces are less important than concepts of movement and disruption.

This is the crux of the institutional problem. The Marine Corps must produce the trained tactical forces to accomplish the goals established at the operational level. If theory is the lens through which doctrine is derived, then an untruthful or unsound theory *must* produce an unsound doctrine. This, in its turn, must lead to incorrect force structure and training. The emphasis of this paper is on the correctness of the theory of maneuver warfare as the basis for Marine Corps operational level doctrine.

Two assumptions assist in the organization of this paper. First, the Marine Corps possesses an historical

understanding of the operational level of war. The best illustration of that history lies in the context of naval campaigns. Second, the maneuver warfare theory represents a fundamental shift in the practice and understanding of the operational level of war.

The organization of this argument revolves around the importance of the historical evolution of the operational level of war. It is the intent of this argument to demonstrate the need for a sound historical basis in the development of theory. Theory is a two-way lens. Theory is developed from historical evidence and study, and, conversely, provides a guide to the study of history. History and theory sections here form the beginning and the basis of the analysis of the maneuver theory and the operational level of war.

The analysis of the maneuver theory examines historical evidence of Marine Corps experience through a look at two naval campaigns. Historical criteria form the basis for the examination of Marine Corps experience. The two campaigns are:

- a) The Solomon Islands Campaign 1942-44;
- b) The Marianas Islands Campaign 1944.

The criteria for the evaluation will be the Schneider framework of twelve characteristics of modern operational art.¹² These characteristics, reduced to three for this evaluation, are:

- 1) Conduct of joint operations and planning;
- 2) Integrated design of distributed campaign plan;
- 3) Logistical structure to support distributed operations.

These three represent the most appropriate for the analysis of a naval campaign, as well as representing a distillation of the most common and broad of the Schneider concepts. Further, analysis of a campaign within the space allotted would not be possible using twelve criteria. These criteria provide a means to establish the value of the historical experience of the Marine Corps at the operational level of war.

Based on this historical analysis, the evaluation continues with analysis of the backing assertions and proofs of the theory. The evaluation assists in determining the truthfulness, soundness, and practical utility of the maneuver theory.

From this analysis flow the conclusions and implications for the United States Marine Corps as a warfighting organization. These conclusions and implications address the future impact of the adoption of the maneuver theory as the basis for operational level doctrine. As history forms the basis of theory, it is history which begins this study of the maneuver theory and the evolution of the operational art.

II. History: Evolution of the Operational Level of War

The evolution of an intermediate level of war

between strategy and tactics developed as a result of several phenomena. Chief among these were the development of large national armies and the technology made available by the industrial revolution. These elements allowed greater efficiency in the ability of the nation state to organize and sustain itself in war. Militarily, this created a condition in which the accomplishment of war aims through a single battle of annihilation became extremely difficult to achieve. Hence, armies were forced to sequence actions to achieve the aims of strategy, or the political goals of the state.³

The thread of development of operational art is found in the evolution of armies. It follows that historically derived criteria best describe the features and characteristics of the operational level of war. Napoleon's campaign in the Russian theater in 1812 is illustrative of that evolution.

Napoleon organized his army of 675,000, into three separate army groupings.⁴ He planned to trap the main Russian army, astride the main avenue of approach to Moscow, and destroy it through a maneuver with his own army group. The two flank armies would attack to tie down the separate northern and southern Russian armies to prevent them aiding or joining the central battle. Thus, Napoleon developed a plan of campaign

which integrated all of these armies into a single concept.⁵ Napoleon also devised a vast plan of supply over the breadth of the theater to support the integrated movement of his army groups.⁶ His plan of supply represented the greatest attempt, to that time, to supply an army in the field from a supply base. Napoleon possessed the operational vision necessary to conduct the Russian campaign. He failed, however, to achieve his ends because he lacked the technological means to control and supply the operational maneuver of his armies.⁷ Within fifty years of the Russian campaign, another war on another continent would provide an example which combined both the vision and the technology to wage war on the scale of Napoleon's Russia.

The American Civil War is the watershed event in the evolution of the concept of the operational level of war.⁸ Due to the enormous size of the theaters of operation in the United States, the Union and Confederate armies both created separate theaters within which the war would be conducted. In March, 1864, General U. S. Grant took central command of the Union Army's war effort;⁹ the existence of the telegraph and the railroad facilitated his planning and execution of operations.

The telegraph, the railroad, and control of the

seas gave the Union the ability to wage war on a scale unprecedented. The telegraph enabled Grant to receive near real-time confirmation of execution and results or requirements,²⁰ allowing him to exercise central direction to the armies of the western and eastern theaters of war. Railroads enabled the Union to mass armies and supply those armies on a new scale. Command of the seas, or put another way, central control of joint (naval) forces, further provided for great flexibility in the movement and supply of large forces in a distributed theater.²¹ In summary, the outlines of some basic features of the operational level of war become apparent during the Civil War for the first time: the central direction of large armies in separate geographical theaters, distributed operations of separate armies, joint operations, and planning and execution of campaigns and major operations within theaters.

While American experience in the Civil War demonstrated the difficulty of attaining a single battle of annihilation to achieve the aims of political strategy, the Prussian (European) experience was different. The Prussians used available technology to achieve the goal of a single decisive battle.²² From 1866 to 1945, the Prussian/German army denied the utility of the operational, or intermediate level of

war. Throughout this period the Germans built the tactical forces and concepts to accomplish the strategic goal of a battle of annihilation.²³ The combination of the lack of an operational doctrine to link their brilliant tactical capabilities to their strategic aims was a primary cause of their failures in World War I and World War II.

The link between doctrine and the force structure of an army can be further demonstrated by using the U.S. Army in World War II as an example. Russell Weigley makes the point that the U.S. Army possessed a doctrine calling for destruction of the enemy's army as the major factor in attaining victory.²⁴ This was the lesson of the Civil War as practiced by Grant,²⁵ and the concept written into the 1941 version of FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations*.²⁶

In spite of this doctrinal emphasis on destruction, Lt. General Lesley J. McNair, as the commander of Army Ground Forces, sought mobility over power in the formation of combat forces.²⁷ He did not seek the same combination of power and mobility evident in the German formations of this period.²⁸ Building highly mobile forces with little destructive power led to an inability to attain decisive, destructive maneuver. General George S. Patton's advance to the Seine River in 1944 provided an example of this

disconnect. While attaining the operational goal of speed and mobile penetration into the rear of the German forces, the maneuver accomplished little in the way of direct or indirect destruction on the German army.²⁹ The maneuver failed twice to encircle and destroy the Germans, once at Falaise and again at the Seine.³⁰ The difference between doctrine and tactical force structure was one cause of this failure. The lesson for a warfighting organization lay in the need for a direct connection between the operational level concepts and doctrine, and the forces built to execute them.

For the United States Marine Corps, a documented concept of the operational art would come late. Not until the 1934 publication, *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, did a need for an understanding of this concept become apparent. For the Marines, the concept gave impetus for doing the types of things which would accomplish the mission in the vast spaces of the Pacific Ocean. Distributed operations, distributed logistics, sequenced operations, and the joint/combined nature of the Pacific theater were all considered to be the normal way of doing business.

The Marines created a tactical force structure and doctrine which nested closely with the operational level concept of amphibious operations. The concept at

the tactical level emphasized the destruction of enemy forces and required the mobility and firepower of naval ships and aircraft to accomplish.³¹ The power required to overcome resistance at the shoreline was the basis for the doctrine, and forces were built, both in the Navy and the Marine Corps, to achieve those ends. The Marines' tactical assault doctrine matched the operational concept of maneuver over the water to destroy Japanese forces on islands. Marine operational doctrine was naval, amphibious, and offensive in nature. Tactical doctrine was based on destruction and a concept of combined land, air, and sea operations. This concept would remain largely unchanged until the end of the Vietnam War.

The Vietnam War, with its trauma of perceived defeat, was a catalyst for a new theory of war. The 'defense reform movement,' a collection of intellectuals, politicians, and defense analysts, sought to reform the U.S. military by offering a theory of war based on maneuver.³² This new theory of war described previous Marine Corps, as well as U.S. Army, doctrine as outdated and irrelevant, and the basis for the loss of the Vietnam War.³³ The reformers believed that all previous American military doctrine was based on an attrition/firepower theory of war.³⁴ The concentration on firepower and attrition was a major

cause of the loss of the Vietnam War, even though the battles were won.³⁵ The reformers solution was a new theory of maneuver which proposed the primacy of the operational level of war, and maneuver, as the keys to victory.³⁶

The maneuver warfare theory laid the seeds for changing the fundamental view of the operational art as practiced by the Marines, and for changing the nature of the Marine tactical forces to execute that view. The importance of this change lay in the impact of theory on the doctrine, and the subsequent changes wrought on an institution which must provide, equip, and train forces to implement that doctrine.

III. Theory and the Operational Level of War

Theory is the lens through which reality, the fundamental nature of war in this case, is viewed. The doctrine for the employment of forces in war flows from theory. Doctrine, in its turn, leads to the formation, equipping, and training of forces with which to wage war.

Theory, according to Carl von Clausewitz, is derived from "analytical investigation...; applied to experience--in our case, to military history...".³⁷ Theory, then can be said to come from two areas, the personal experience of war, and the critical analysis of military history.³⁸ For the United States Marine

Corps the fundamental nature of war is found in Clausewitz book On War. Two quotes from Clausewitz are appropriate to this study regarding the nature of theory.

Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgement, and help him to avoid pitfalls.³⁹

Even these principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather than to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take.⁴⁰

Deciding to accept Clausewitz' description of the nature of war,⁴¹ the Marine Corps rejected Clausewitz' conclusion. Clausewitz wrote that the primary means to break an enemy's will to fight came through destruction.⁴² The Marine Corps has chosen a theory which poses the primacy of maneuver to break an enemy's will to fight, not through his destruction, but through moral or mental dislocation caused by maneuver.

The theory of maneuver warfare is based on inductive logic. Inductive logic takes a subject, or class, and, through a process of analysis, derives backing assertions about some events of this class.

Proofs are presented to support these assertions. From the assertions, the argument makes an inductive 'leap' to a conclusion about *all* such events.⁴³ The following is a breakdown of the theory of maneuver warfare as an inductive logical argument:

Class: Military victory in campaigns and battles.

Assertions:

- 1) Inferior forces achieve consistent victory, i.e., numerical relationships are irrelevant to the outcome.⁴⁴
- 2) Battles are avoided.⁴⁵
- 3) Deception is of central importance in order to achieve success with an inferior force which is maneuvering to avoid battle.⁴⁶
- 4) Victory is due to psychological disruption of enemy mental balance, view, and control of reality.⁴⁷
- 5) Maneuver of forces on the battlefield is the means to the end of disruption and not the application of firepower or destruction.⁴⁸
- 6) The intangibles dominate the action by insuring that momentum or tempo (speed of maneuver) creates the conditions for disruption by moving inside (more quickly) the enemy decision cycle.⁴⁹
- 7) Fighting (combat) is incidental to victory.⁵⁰
- 8) The operational level of war is decisive because it is the lowest level at which all these elements can be brought together in an integrated scheme of warfare.⁵¹

Proofs:

- 1) Prussian/German Army
 - Leuthen
 - 1918 Offensives (infiltration tactics)
 - 1939 Poland
 - 1940 France
 - 1941-2 Russia
- 2) Israel - 1956, 1967, 1973
- 3) Finland - Current plan of national defense.

Conclusion: (Inductive Leap) - The cause of victory is the systemic disruption of an enemy force through maneuver to interrupt his decision cycle and his perception of reality.⁵²

Therefore: Victory is to be sought through maneuver at

the operational level, not in the physical destruction of the enemy in battle, but in the disruption of his cohesion to act.⁵³

The theory of maneuver warfare lays the foundation for the subsequent formation of doctrine within the United States Marine Corps and establishes the primacy of the operational level of war.

The theoretical foundations for the concept of the operational level of war are rooted in modern military history and presented by various theorists. The Russian and German theorists are of particular note. On the Prussian/German side only Sigismund von Schlichting is prominent, and he failed to move the Prussian Great General Staff away from the concept of the single battle of annihilation.⁵⁴ The primary Russian theorists are G.A. Leer, N.P. Miknehvich, A.A. Svechin, A.A. Neznamov, V.K. Triandafillov, and M.N. Tukhachevskiy. Both groups reached the same primary conclusions separately, with little cross-referencing.⁵⁵ The Napoleonic wars heavily influenced both schools. Each recognized the revolution in the technological means of war. Both schools recognized the primacy of battle and destruction of the enemy as the means to victory. Further, each observed that battle, as the culmination of maneuver, became more destructive, and decisive, as a result of the new technologies.⁵⁶ Here, however, it is necessary to

point out the divergent direction each school took in describing what was to become known as the operational level of war.

The Prussian/German school recognized the changing nature of war, but did not develop a concept of an intermediate level of war. The expanding size of armies and the increasing lethality of the battlefield led to larger frontages. These developments allowed armies to concentrate over increasingly larger distances. The Prussians understood that it had become much more difficult to destroy an enemy in one climatic battle. Clausewitz stated, "...wars today consist of a large number of engagements, great and small, simultaneous or consecutive,...the political object cannot always be seen as a single issue. ...the aim can no longer be achieved by a single tremendous act of war. Rather it must be reached by a large number of more or less important actions, all combined into one whole."⁵⁷ From this positive beginning, however, the Prussian school would drift towards using the technological means available to achieve victory in a battle of annihilation. The political object became more and more divorced from the essential military activities which were necessary to achieve it.⁵⁸ Hence, Clausewitz' reminder that the political object must be dominant was ignored. The operational level of

war which demands the unity of action between tactical success and the strategic (political) goal was lost.

The Russian school was essentially home grown. Heavily influenced by Jomini, the physical geography of Russia made the appearance of the operational art an almost certainty. From their experience, writers such as Miknehvich and Neznamov "believed that modern war would no longer be decided by the outcome of a single climactic engagement. Rather, modern war consisted of a series of engagements and operations linked to one another by the overall concept of the war plan. The plan guided the fulfillment of discrete but related tasks; therefore, the accomplishment of general strategic objectives occurred during the actual course of operations."⁵³ Neznamov, as did the Prussians, believed in the decisive primacy of battle and destruction within the concept of this operational scheme. "Battles, he believed, would be integral components of future operations conducted not only by a single army, but by groups of two or three armies, a development that would create the need for additional organizational and intellectual linkages."⁵⁴

For the Prussian/German and Russian schools of thought, victory is achieved through annihilation and destruction of the enemy. This is demonstrated, in the case of the Prussian/German school, through the

writings of Clausewitz,⁶¹ Alfred Count von Schlieffen,⁶² von Schlichting,⁶³ and Ludwig Beck.⁶⁴ Further, Miknehvich,⁶⁵ Neznamov,⁶⁶ Tukhachevskiy,⁶⁷ and V.G. Reznichenko,⁶⁸ revealed this same line of thought by the Russian/Soviet theorists.

While the Germans understood the necessity for the sequenced destruction of the enemy and the need for unity of effort, they did not recognize an intermediate level of war. German practice continued to seek tactical success as the primary means of achieving strategic success without the necessity for another level of war. The Russians, both operationally and theoretically, however, recognized the necessity of the operational level of war to give meaning to tactical victories.

The United States Marine Corps doctrinal publications recognize the linkage between the strategic goal and the success of tactical operations which is the essence of the operational art. The dichotomy for the Marine Corps lies in the fact that the theory of maneuver warfare does not recognize the primacy of destruction. It is destruction which underlies the historical and theoretical application of the operational art. The Marine Corps has adopted a theory and doctrine which presupposes that destruction is not necessary or in some cases desirable.⁶⁹ Is the

Marine Corps correct in basing its theory and doctrine on an operational concept which is alien to the history and theory on which it is based?

IV. U.S. Marine Corps and the Operational Level of War

The purpose of this section is to examine the historical experience of the Marine Corps in World War II through the chosen historical criteria. The examination of this experience will aid in determining the value of the criteria, as well as the validity of the Marine Corps experience of the operational level of war.

The historical criteria chosen for this analysis are as follows:

- 1) Conduct of joint operations and planning;
- 2) Integrated design of distributed campaign plan;
- 3) Logistical structure to support distributed operations.

The thread of these criteria are woven throughout the history and, hence, the theory of the operational art. These are the practical traits which the theorists have ascribed to the practice of, and the need for, this level of war.

The conduct of joint operations and planning criteria refers to the evolution of operations which cut across service, and in some cases national, boundaries. The evidence for central direction of all

services toward the accomplishment of strategic goals is sought in the use of this criteria. For example, the integration of naval support to General Sherman's advance north from Savannah in 1864⁷⁰ demonstrates the type of evidence sought for this criteria. Operational level planning envisions the employment of all service components, air, land, and sea.

The integrated design of a distributed campaign plan criteria refers to the evolution of the necessity for the sequencing of operations within a campaign plan. This sequencing includes the integration of maneuver, fires, and logistics on an operational level. This is demonstrated by a plan of campaign over widely distributed theaters of war or operations. The central direction which General Grant provided to Union armies in the eastern and western theaters of war from 1864 is an example of the evidence for this criteria. In particular, General Grant integrated the concept of support by railroad and naval forces both within and between theaters. He likewise integrated the maneuver of General Sherman's army with his own in a single plan of campaign.⁷¹

A logistical structure must be in place to make possible the conduct of widely separated major operations in a campaign design.. Logistical structure to support distributed operations refers to the idea

that logistics is the thread binding all operational designs.¹² This area is divided into two categories, sustainment and transportation. "Sustainment is concerned with the supply, maintenance, and sheltering of the forces. Transportation provides the movement of the forces."¹³ The historical evidence demonstrates a link between the operational base of operations and the lines of communication which support them.

Erwin Rommel's campaign in North Africa in 1942 exemplifies a campaign in which the failure of logistics in an operational sense was a primary cause of defeat. While Rommel possessed a secure base of operations and lines of communication, he lacked the transportation structure necessary to transport the required logistical support to the maneuver forces.¹⁴ In the final analysis, "Logistics is the final arbiter of operations."¹⁵

The criteria outlined above provide a structure for the examination of historical campaigns. The relevance of these criteria lie in the idea that history is the basis for the development of both theory and doctrine. The historical campaigns which provide the vehicle for this analysis are the following:

- 1) Solomon Islands Campaign, 1942-44;
- 2) Marianas Islands Campaign, 1944.

Each campaign will be examined according to the criteria, which will help focus on the essential

elements of the historical practice of the operational art. The intent is to describe only enough of the campaign to highlight the experience of the operational level of war and to establish the credibility of the experience. The criteria aid in judging the truthfulness of the experience.

The Solomon Islands Campaign, 1942-44, was initiated in response to the continued Japanese advance towards Australia and the vital supply lines between Australia and the United States.⁷⁶ After the 1942 battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, the United States sought to stem the Japanese advance at the earliest opportunity. Vital to this effort was the need to stop the Japanese advance and transition to the offensive. Guadalcanal was chosen to provide the capture of an airfield. Land-based aircraft, flown from this island, could provide air cover for the landing forces and ensure the safety of the surrounding seas for the ships which would resupply the landing force. Further, Guadalcanal began the offensive destruction of the Japanese army and, most importantly, the Japanese navy in the Pacific. The essential elements of the chain of command and the plan of campaign for the Solomon Islands Campaign are found in Appendix 1.

Under the strategic command of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the operational level commanders, for the

campaign in the Solomons, were Commander, South Pacific (COMSOPAC), Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (and Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. from 18 Oct 1942), and Commander, Southwest Pacific (COMSOWESPAC), General Douglas MacArthur. For the conduct of the amphibious offensives, COMSOPAC created the position of Commander, Amphibious Forces South Pacific (PHIBFORSPAC), under Admiral R. K. Turner.⁷⁷ The Commander of the Marine Provisional Corps, later the I Marine Amphibious Corps, was General A. A. Vandegrift.

Doctrinally, the plan for an amphibious assault is based on the scheme of maneuver ashore.⁷⁸ The employment of the forces assigned to COMSOPAC for this campaign were based on the plan of maneuver ashore on each island. Further, doctrine specified that the Commander, Landing Force (CLF), is co-equal to the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), for planning.⁷⁹ Although the Marines did not command what today would be the operational level, the plan for the employment of the forces assigned to COMSOPAC was based on the scheme of maneuver designed by the Commander, Landing Force, the commander of the Marine Provisional Corps.⁸⁰ The Marine Corps gained the practice and insight into the operational level of war by planning for the employment of the forces assigned to the operational commander. In this way, the Marines acted

to set the conditions for tactical success which is the goal at the operational level. Further, the Marines developed the tactical forces and amphibious training demanded by the operational conditions.

The first criteria establishes that the campaign be planned and conducted as a joint effort. Throughout this campaign, the major operations were planned to utilize all available forces towards the common goal regardless of service origin. Admiral Turner describes the Japanese as causing all service rivalries to be buried in the face of the need for unified action to defeat the Japanese.⁸¹ During the operations on New Georgia in 1943-44, the I Marine Amphibious Corps commanded elements of the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and elements of the army of New Zealand.⁸²

The second criteria describes the integrated design of a distributed campaign plan as another historical element of the operational level of war. All operations in the campaign incorporated the use of air, naval, and ground forces in support of landing operations. During the major operations to secure the central Solomons, operations were conducted on three separate islands as well as simultaneous landings in the Bismark Archipelago.⁸³ Throughout 1943 and 1944, the campaign to reduce Rabaul was conducted by simultaneous and distributed operations over several

thousand miles of ocean which comprise the Bismarck Archipelago and Solomon Islands chains.³⁴

The third criteria describes the requirement for the use of a logistics system to support the distributed operations in widely separated theaters of operations. The Marine Corps supported three separate theaters of operations, during 1943, as indicated below:

- 1) Southwest Pacific - 1st MarDiv - Cape Gloucester (New Britain/Bismarck Archipelago)
- 2) South Pacific - 3rd MarDiv - New Georgia (Solomon Islands)
- 3) Central Pacific - 2nd MarDiv - Tarawa (Gilbert Islands)

The Marine Corps developed theater-wide logistics, incorporating Navy transports, to provide, equip, maintain, train, and man these divisions, as well as those being formed in the United States.

The second campaign example is the Marianas Islands Campaign of June - August 1944. *Appendix 2* details both the chain of command and the plan for the campaign.

The Commander, V Marine Amphibious Corps, General H.M. Smith, as Commander, Landing Forces, and co-equal for planning to the Commander, Expeditionary Forces, Admiral R.K. Turner, planned the scheme of maneuver ashore. This plan was the basis for the employment of the forces assigned to the Commander, Fifth U.S. Fleet,

Admiral R. A. Spruance.⁸⁵

A brief examination of the campaign using the established criteria reveals insights similar to the Solomon Islands Campaign. First, the concept of the joint planning and conduct of the campaign again proved to be in line with the historical criteria. The V Marine Amphibious Corps commanded two Marine divisions and one brigade as well as two U. S. Army Infantry divisions.⁸⁶ The requirement to plan for the sequenced employment of naval air and sea forces, U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) land-based air, and Marine and Army ground forces emphasizes the joint nature of the planning and conduct of this campaign.

The integrated nature of the plan of campaign called for the seizure of Guam and Tinian in sequence after the seizure of Saipan.⁸⁷ The major points of this criteria are visible in the sequencing of operations, the integration of carrier and land-based air, assault, and support shipping, all nested within a single plan of campaign. The dispersion of the objectives in space, and the allocation of forces in time, demonstrated the distributed nature of the campaign. The plan accomplished the sequenced destruction of the Japanese Thirty-first Army in the Marianas,⁸⁸ as well as the destruction of the remaining Japanese carrier air forces of the First

Combined Fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.³⁹

Finally, the Marine Corps was again required to support operations over a vast area. This was exemplified by the simultaneous planning and conduct of the Peleliu (Palau Islands) operation by the 1st Marine Division in September of 1944 in the COMSOWESPAC theater.⁴⁰ Further, the Marine Corps was readying two new Marine divisions, the 5th and 6th, for future operations. Again, the lessons of the Solomon Islands Campaign were confirmed and reiterated. The need for distributed logistics to support extended operations in different theaters of operations required the Marines to develop the necessary system to supply, equip, man, and train forces in these theaters.⁴¹

In summary, the foregoing analysis validates the truthfulness of the experience and conduct of the operational level of war learned by the Marines during World War II. The Marine Corps demonstrated in practice those essential elements of the operational art represented by the criteria. As of 1989, however, the Marine Corps embarked on a fundamental change with the adoption of the theory of maneuver warfare.

V. Maneuver Theory and the Operational Level of War

The purpose of this section is to examine the truthfulness, soundness, and usefulness of the maneuver theory as it pertains to the operational level of war.

This examination centers on an analysis of the backing assertions and proofs offered by the theory to determine if the inductive 'leap' of the theory is warranted.

The maneuver theory is a valid inductive argument. It meets the standards of good form which govern this type of argument. The analysis will reveal whether or not the inductive 'leap' of the maneuver theory is warranted by demonstrating the soundness or correctness of the move from backing assertions to the conclusion. The demonstration of the incorrectness of the backing assertions, by showing at least one of them to be false or uncertain, will prove the argument to be *unsound*, though not *invalid*.⁹² To demonstrate unsoundness, the theory will be analyzed for its correct, or truthful, adherence to an historical criteria for the operational level of war.

The theory of maneuver asserts that victory in war is achieved through the psychological dislocation caused by maneuver within an enemy's decision cycle. This is a fundamental change from Marine Corps experience. While in World War II, the destruction of Japanese forces in battle was the goal of operational maneuver, future battles are to be won through maneuver without the necessity for battle, or at least significant combat. Destruction is incidental to

victory. In an historical sense, then, the maneuver theory proposes a fundamentally different reason for victory. This proposal is different not only from Marine Corps experience, but also from German and Russian experience. How does the maneuver theory arrive at this conclusion?

The theory of the operational level of war as described in Marine Corps doctrinal publications uses the following definition as the basis for the execution of the operational art:

Operational Level of War - The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

This definition differs from a maneuver warfare definition which also describes the execution of the operational art as follows:

The operational art is the art of using tactical events--battles and refusals to give battle--to strike directly at an enemy's strategic center of gravity. In other words, it is the art of deciding when and where to fight battles, and when and where not to, on a strategic basis. It includes the idea that a goal is to win strategically with the fewest possible battles.⁹⁴

The presentation of these two definitions provides a glimpse of the problems associated with the adoption of the maneuver theory and its concept of the operational art. The first definition provides the Marine Corps with some indication of the concrete types of things required to conduct the operational level of war. The maneuver definition offers only the barest of concepts upon which to build a plan of campaign. This lack of precision is a key problem associated with the analysis of the operational level of war within the maneuver theory.

The basic concept of the operational level of war within the maneuver theory is based on three of the backing assertions presented earlier.

It is clear that the three operational principles here discussed (avoidance, deception, and the dominance of the intangible momentum) are all interrelated, and indeed that their connection is the true essence of all offensive operational methods of warfare that have a high relational-maneuver content. ...the enemy's own strength is successfully avoided. That in turn can only be done by deception, ... Deception, in turn, can only be sustained if the whole operation has a momentum that exceeds the speed of the intelligence-decision-action cycle of the defending forces. ...It is because of this interrelationship that the decisive level of warfare in the relational-maneuver manner is the operational, that being the lowest level at which avoidance, deception, and the dominance of momentum can be brought together within an integrated scheme of warfare.²²

For the purpose of this evaluation, the above three

principles will serve as the basis for comparison with the historical criteria.

The maneuver theory takes as its primary proof the German army tactical and 'operational' methods of the period 1939-1942.⁹⁶ The evaluation of the maneuver theory examines this proof through a counter-example of the German army and the two Marine Corps campaigns given above.

The first concept is the avoidance of the enemy's strength. At first glance this would appear to make perfect sense. However, in the maneuver theory, this concept is extended to mean the avoidance of battle under almost any conditions. The maneuver theory poses that any engagement slows down the tempo, or momentum, of the attack such that the battle could be lost as a result of this slowing.⁹⁷ This is tied to the maneuver concept that numbers are of relatively less importance in a maneuver style of warfare.⁹⁸ Only by battle are casualties taken, and therefore battle is to be avoided; the smaller force can ill afford them. In a circular fashion, then, the maintenance of momentum or tempo means fewer casualties, but that same tempo means the systemic disruption of the enemy leading to victory. Since it is the tempo of the attack which leads to the disruption of the enemy's decision cycle, and not his destruction, battle can and should be

avoided.⁹⁹

Neither the German example, nor the Marine Corps example, bear out the truth of this statement. The Germans did not believe that the purpose of maneuver was to disrupt as stated by the maneuver theorists. Instead, maneuver was viewed as the means to a battle of annihilation.¹⁰⁰ The Germans, during the period 1939-1942, maneuvered at the small and large unit levels for the purpose of destruction, not to disrupt.¹⁰¹ The Germans practiced the principle stated by Clausewitz that the will of the enemy to fight (systemic disruption in maneuver theory jargon) is purchased at the price of the enemy's destruction.¹⁰²

In World War II, the Marine Corps conducted operations for the purpose of destroying Japanese. While many landings during the Solomon Islands campaign occurred where the enemy was initially weak,¹⁰³ the intent of the landings was to bring the Japanese to battle and destroy them. Wherever the Japanese enemy could not be avoided on the immediate landing, as at Munda, Tarawa, the Marianas, Peleliu, or Iwo Jima, the landings still went forward. In warfighting, combat remained the means to attain victory, and this meant the destruction of the enemy whether the attacker was German or American.

The second point in the maneuver theory is the

idea of the central importance of deception. In the maneuver theory deception is tied to the concept of speed of movement or mobility. Deception is important at all levels of war, and encompasses the full range of measures taken to deceive an enemy of the time, location, and strength of attack.

The concept of deception was a primary tenet of all German army and U. S. Marine Corps operations during World War II. For example, the German army deceived the French as to the location and strength of their main effort during the campaign in France in 1940. The amphibious demonstration is a vital deception technique used by the Marines to particular effect on Saipan in 1944, and Okinawa in 1945. Indeed, for any commander wishing to have the maximum advantage in any combat which follows maneuver, deception is a key part of the plan. This holds true regardless of the type and style of warfare practiced, whether maneuver, attrition, or a combination. The contention that deception has a greater and more powerful effect in a maneuver style of warfare is not proven by the use of the German army.

The final point of the maneuver theorists is that intangibles tend to dominate the operational level of war. Momentum may dominate all other priorities such as firepower and lethality.¹⁰⁴ For the German army

this point cannot be supported by the facts. The Germans conceived of war in two methods, a war of movement, and a war of position.¹⁰⁵ The German concept of momentum, in a war of movement, is a balanced one of mobility and power.¹⁰⁶ The German army practiced combined arms maneuver.¹⁰⁷ Maneuver for the German army was intended to bring about the annihilation of an enemy under favorable conditions. Momentum was viewed within the intent of the maneuver, to destroy. Tempo was the product of the speed with which the weapons of a unit could be brought to bear to destroy the enemy before he could strengthen his defense.¹⁰⁸ The German concept of momentum nested within the concept of the primacy of destruction and the speed of destruction. The intent of German maneuver, hence tempo, was destruction and not disruption as stated by the maneuver theorists.¹⁰⁹

The operations conducted in the Solomon Islands during World War II created a sense of momentum which was not related to the speed of movement indicated as a requirement by the maneuver theory. The Solomons campaign started in August, 1942, and did not conclude until late in 1944.¹¹⁰ The necessity for speed of movement on an operational level was not the critical issue. Momentum in this case was similar to the German concept of destruction. The operational speed of

advance was sequenced to accomplish the mission assigned, the reduction of Rabaul, within the limits of forces assigned. The destruction of Japanese forces was accomplished in a fashion that certainly gave the momentum to the American forces, but was not predicated on an artificial concept of movement. In the maneuver sense, momentum is speed of movement; in the Solomons momentum was the sequential destruction of the Japanese over space and time. The U.S. Navy provided operational mobility to the Marine Corps. In an operational sense, the momentum of seaborne forces may bear little resemblance or relevance to an understanding of momentum based solely on the speed of tactical land movement or mobility.

The concept of momentum in the maneuver theory is further tied to the idea that lethality, firepower, and superior numbers are of lesser value.¹¹¹ The proof of this conjecture lies again in the German army of 1939-1942. These basic tenets of maneuver warfare cannot be shown to be truthful. Again, this concept rests in the idea which permeates all of the maneuver theory, that this style of warfare enables the inferior force to defeat a larger force. German, Russian, American, and certainly Marine experience in warfare demonstrates that numbers count regardless of your operational doctrine. The maneuver concept that fighting and

destruction are incidental to victory is not truthful. The Japanese had to be fought and destroyed. The Russians and the Germans learned that victory was only possible through the destruction of each other's armies.

German and Russian doctrine and experience demonstrated that no matter how fast one moved the ultimate purpose of maneuver is annihilation.¹¹² Both the Germans and the Russians accepted that the systemic disruption sought by the maneuver theory was bought in the process of destruction and not in movement. This is consistent with Marine Corps experience in combat against the Japanese. In fact, it can fairly be stated that against the Japanese there was no moral dislocation possible short of death.

The maneuver theory makes no allowance for the historical evolution of the operational level of war. While describing three backing assertions which are said to be the essence of the operational art, those assertions do not explain or illuminate the features of the operational level of war. Indeed, the Germans accepted no intermediate level of war, so to use the German army to illustrate the operational level of war has little, if any, utility. Comparing the criteria for the evolution of operational art to the tenets of the maneuver warfare theory is like comparing apples

and bricks, there is no basis for comparison. The backing assertions of the maneuver warfare theory cannot be shown to be truthful.

VI. Conclusion

The United States Marine Corps is a warfighting organization. As such it is tasked to provide forces for employment in time of war, national emergency, or any other purpose which the President may direct. Over its history of 215 years, the Marine Corps developed a unique reputation as a combat force without peer. The adoption of the maneuver warfare theory as the basis for operational, as well as tactical, doctrine had the intent of maintaining and improving the Marine Corps' ability to fight into the next century. Unfortunately, the theory of maneuver appears badly flawed. The adherence to this theory may actually reduce, not enhance, the ability of Marine Corps units to fight.

The maneuver theory takes the Marines away from their historical tradition by 'selling' the Marine Corps on an interpretation of history which is both logically and historically unsound. The maneuver theory offers an explanation of the fundamental nature of war as one in which elegant maneuver can substitute for bloodshed. The maneuver theory offers an explanation for how a force which is outnumbered can win through the quick movement which disrupts an

enemy's thought process.¹¹³ The maneuver theory tells the Marines that their previous history was incorrect, and now irrelevant, because it was based on the application of firepower with the intent to destroy, rather than to disrupt.¹¹⁴

The maneuver theory offers the primacy of the operational level of war because it is the level at which maneuver is most important.¹¹⁵ The maneuver theory takes the concept of bloodshed and violence out of the fundamental nature of war and offers a bloodless way to victory. The maneuver theory's use of history is flawed and its logic is unsound.

The theory calls for a reduction in the firepower assets which are needed for the destruction of enemy forces.¹¹⁶ The theory advocates the reduction of mechanized assets in favor of a movement to a concept of light infantry.¹¹⁷ The training of Marine tactical forces has been changed to highlight the idea of lightness and a focus on low-intensity combat.¹¹⁸ Previous Marine doctrine of balanced combined arms forces capable of fighting across the operational spectrum of conflict changes as a result of this theory.

The operational doctrine which is derived from the maneuver theory is flawed. The tactical doctrine which flows from that operational doctrine is further flawed.

Finally, the combat forces which must be developed and trained according to those doctrines will be flawed.

The inductive 'leap' of the maneuver warfare theory and its application as operational level doctrine cannot be demonstrated as being truthful or correct. The untruthful nature of the theory lies in its backing assertion that avoidance of battle is a key to the operational art. The proof offered is the German army of World War II. This proof is false. German maneuver was conducted for the purpose of attaining a battle of annihilation. Avoidance of battle and maneuver to disrupt are not German concepts.

The concept of momentum is a second backing assertion which is untrue. The proof offered is again the German army of World War II. Again, the maneuver concept of momentum is tied to a concept of speed of movement to avoid battle, and maneuver to disrupt. The German army of World War II did not operate under these concepts.

The inductive 'leap' of the maneuver theory is unwarranted given the untruthful nature of the backing assertions and their proofs. Therefore, the conclusion of the maneuver theory that victory, at the operational level of war, is to be found in maneuver to disrupt the enemy's cohesion to act cannot be demonstrated as truthful. The logic of the maneuver theory is unsound.

The usefulness of the maneuver theory as a basis for the development of operational level doctrine must also be questioned. The theory does not address the requirement for joint, integrated plans, and the execution of campaigns and major operations. It ascribes an operational level of war to the German army which neither developed, nor saw the need for, the operational concept of three levels of war. It is the inability to demonstrate a historical or theoretical basis for the maneuver theory of operational art which creates an out of focus operational doctrine for the United States Marine Corps. The implications for the Marines lie in the fact that an unsound doctrine will produce fighting forces which will bear little resemblance to the requirements of the fundamental nature of war.

VII. Implications

The primary focus of this paper has been an historical one. The lessons of history are those which fighting organizations adopt over time to explain their successes and their failures. For the Marine Corps, the lessons of history have been the lessons of close combat and destruction of the enemy.

The Marine Corps recognizes that tactical victory is not enough. The concept of the operational level of war is one which has been practiced and understood by

Marines since World War II. That understanding did not come from a theory based on maneuver, but from the lessons of battle. Those lessons were learned on a battlefield where no elegant or bloodless maneuver could substitute for the destruction of the enemy. Maneuver, firepower, and close combat were the essential elements which caused the defeat of an enemy.

The concept of a unique and separate theory of maneuver separated from a 'theory' of firepower is neither historical nor logical.¹¹⁹ Marine Corps history demonstrates that maneuver and firepower are inseparably linked. It is to that history of combat that the Marine Corps must look to develop its theory and doctrines of war. War, whether at the operational or tactical level, is not elegant. The Marine Corps has built and trained its forces for 215 years with that thought in mind. The Marines have not forgotten that war is a violent and bloody business. With the acceptance of the maneuver theory and its concept of the operational art, that history is about to be changed. It is to its own history that the Marines must turn to develop theories and doctrines which match the fundamental nature of war as described in FMFM 1, *Warfighting*. The following question posed by Clausewitz should be uppermost in the minds of Marines

as they abandon their history for a theory as badly flawed as the theory of maneuver warfare.

How are we to counter the highly sophisticated theory that supposes it possible for a particularly ingenious method of inflicting minor direct damage on the enemy's forces to lead to major indirect destruction; or that claims to produce, by means of limited but skillfully applied blows, such paralysis of the enemy's forces and control of his will-power as to constitute a significant shortcut to victory?¹²⁰


APPENDIX 1: The Solomon Islands Campaign 1942-44¹²¹

	ENDS	WAYS	MEANS
STRATEGIC	1-Destroy Rabaul 2-Begin Offensive 3-Halt Jap expansion	1-Land Forces in Solomons 2-Destroy Jap forces thus bought to battle 3-Continue offensive	COMSOPAC- Admiral Ghormley/Halsey COMSOWESPAC- General MacArthur
OPERATIONAL	Bring Jap forces to battle and destroy them in 1-Solomons - COMSOPAC 2-Bismark Archipelago - COMSOWESPAC	1-Seize Guadalcanal 2-Advance up Solomons Island chain and Bismark Archipelago to seize Rabaul 3-Destroy Jap forces attempting to halt offensive	1-USN carrier task 2-COMPHIBFORSCOPAC Admiral Turner 3-USN/USMC land based air 4-I Marine Amphibious Corps General Vandegrift 5-XIV USA Corps
TACTICAL	1-Sequential destruction of Jap air, sea, and land forces by assault on Guadalcanal, Russell, New Georgia, New Britain, Cape Gloucester, Rabaul	1-Amphibious assault 2-Air and sea attacks against Jap forces and bases in Solomons	1-USN Amphib and support ships 2-USMC Divisions and separate units 3-USA Divisions and separate units and USAAF 4-Combined forces of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji

APPENDIX 2: The Marianas Islands Campaign¹²²

	ENDS	WAYS	MEANS
STRATEGIC	1-Sec base for bombing of Japan 2-Isolate Carolines (Truk) 3-Secure position to control SLOC's to Japan 4-Secure pos to launch assault on Japan, Bonin's, Ryukyu's	1-Amphibious Assault to seize Marianas Islands 2-Secure friendly LOC's 3-Secure command of seas 4-Secure command of air 5-Destruction of Jap counterattack forces	1-Fifth Fleet Admiral Spruance
OPERATIONAL	1-Sec cmd of sea 2-Sec cmd of air 3-Sec LOC's to zone of assault 4-Destroy Jap air, sea, land forces	1-Sequential seizure of Marianas Islands	1-Joint Exped Force- Admiral Turner 2-Advance Force 3-Fast Carrier Task Group 4-V Marine Amnic Force General H.M. Smith
TACTICAL	1-Seize Saipan 15 Jun 44 2-Seize Guam 21 Jul 44 3-Seize Tinian 24 Jul 44	1-Amphibious assault 2-Carrier Ops against Jap 1st Combined Fleet	1-2nd & 4th Marine Div 2-1st ProvMarBde 3-77th & 27th USA Inf Div

APPENDIX 3: PACIFIC OCEAN AREA



THE WAR WITH JAPAN

A. Initial Japanese Control

6 August 1942

B. The Allied Reorganization

20 March 1942

ENDNOTES

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¹⁰ Philip J. Crowl and Jeter A. Isely, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 8.

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- (1) The employment of several independent field armies distributed in the same theater;
- (2) The employment of quasi-army HQ to control them;
- (3) A logistical structure to support distributed operations;
- (4) The integrated design of a distributed campaign plan;

- (5) The conduct of distributed operations;
- (6) The strategic employment of cavalry;
- (7) The deep strike;
- (8) The conduct of joint operations;
- (9) The execution of joint operations;
- (10) The continuous front;
- (11) The distributed battlefield;
- (12) The exercise of field commands by officers with operational vision.

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³⁶ Steven L. Canby and Edward N. Luttwak, "Mindset: National Styles in Warfare and Operational Level of Planning, Conduct and Analysis, op.cit., p. 21.

³⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, op.cit., p. 141.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 170.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 141.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ FMFM 1, op.cit., p. 79.

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⁴⁴ John R. Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict," op.cit., p. 16.

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⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Steven L. Canby and Edward N. Luttwak, "Mindset: National Styles in Warfare and the Operational Level of Planning, Conduct and Analysis," op.cit., p. 19.

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